| چکیده انگلیسی مقاله |
Husserl believes that under the impact of modern science as inaugurated by Galileo, the Life-world - i.e., the world of common experience - has been replaced by the objectively true world of science which, in the thinking of modern western man, passes for reality. On the one hand, Husserl in opposition to the objective view of the world insists that the Life-world is the meaning-fundament of scientific thinking and the sphere of original evidences. On the other hand, he maintains that the theoretical results of science take on the character of validities for the Life-world, adding themselves as such to its own composition. Husserl, at first, considers the Life-world in the context of the objective science critique, but describing the subjective-relative Life-world, which includes science, it would not remain as a partial problem within the general problem of the objective science. The invariant and common structures that abstract from the subjective-relative Life-world yield the universal Life-world a priori. Therefore, the Life-world which firstly appeared as a partial problem within the general problem of the objective science, namely, functions as the foundation of sciences. Eventually, it is disclosed, in terms of Husserl, as a universal and genuine problem for philosophy. This paper deals with the view of the relationship of the Life-world and science, and demonstrates the Life-world conception as a universal problem |